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BREACH OF FAITH: A LACK OF POLICY FOR RESPONDING TO
DATA BREACHES AND WHAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD
DO ABOUT IT
Jared Burns*
Abstract
One data breach in the summer of 2015 against the United States
government cost taxpayers more than $350 million. Since 2005, the U.S.
government has lost more than 183 million personnel records and
countless files containing sensitive information. Despite all of this, the
government has failed to create a policy for responding to data breaches.
As proof of a lack of any clear policy, this Note analyzes two recent
breaches against the government and explains how the responses, or lack
thereof, are at opposite ends of the response continuum.
This Note creates a policy for government response to data breaches.
This policy analyzes the factors surrounding the breach, including the
actor who perpetrated the breach, the information stolen, and the potential
uses for that information. This Note then lays out a continuum of potential
responses, from doing nothing to kinetic action. Lastly, this Note creates
a decision matrix that assigns responses to breaches based on the factors
of the breach. The result is a policy shell that allows government decision
makers to respond to breaches in a way that instills confidence in the
American public and deters potential hackers.
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INTRODUCTION
What do a targeted drone strike,1 a $133 million identity monitoring
contract,2 and the resignation of the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management all have in common?3 They were all actions by the U.S.
government in response to data breaches in the summer of 2015.4 Since
2005, government entities have lost at least 183 million personnel records
as a result of data breaches.5 The Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) breach in the summer of 2015 cost the U.S. taxpayers at least $350
million,6 not to mention the risks to national security and the damage to
the intelligence community.7 Currently the government lacks any type of
decisional framework for responding to data breaches, resulting in
haphazard responses that range from targeted killings to doing nothing.8
1. Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura, Briton Who Recruited Online for ISIS is Reported Killed,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2015, at A3.
2. News Release, Office of Pers. Mgmt., OPM, DoD Announce Identity Theft Protection
and Credit Monitoring Contract (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.opm.gov/news/releases/2015/09/
opm-dod-announce-identity-theft-protection-and-credit-monitoring-contract/.
3. Erin Kelly & David Jackson, OPM Chief Katherine Archuleta Resigns, USA TODAY,
(July 10, 2015, 4:36 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/07/10/opm-chiefarchuleta-resigns/29965857/.
4. See supra notes 1–3.
5. Data Breaches, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/databreach (last visited Jan. 23, 2017) (providing statistics for all reported data breaches).
6. News Release, Office of Pers. Mgmt., supra note 2. The contract announced by OPM
was listed at $133 million, however, the contract is renewable for three years and it cost OPM $20
million to notify those affected by the breach. Elizabeth Harrington, OPM Hack Costing
Taxpayers $350 Million, WASH. FREE BEACON (Sept. 2, 2015, 10:39 AM),
http://freebeacon.com/issues/opm-hack-costing-taxpayers-350-million/.
7. Dan Verton, Impact of OPM Breach Could Last More Than 40 Years, FED SCOOP (July
12, 2015, 4:43 PM), http://fedscoop.com/opm-losses-a-40-year-problem-for-intelligencecommunity (quoting former CIA Director Michael Hayden as saying that the threat to intelligence
could last forty years, until the last of those whose information was stolen retires from federal
service).
8. David Sanger, U.S. Decides to Retaliate Against China’s Hacking, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1,
2015, at A6 (stating that the Obama administration has struggled to develop a response to the
OPM hack).
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In order to effectively defend against cyber intrusions and attacks, the
government must combine nontechnical with technical means.9
Technical means refer to the hardware and software used to protect
networks, whereas nontechnical means “usually combines leadership,
education, and policy development.”10 This Note will only focus on the
third aspect of nontechnical means, “policy development.”11 This Note
develops a range of responses to data breaches against the government,
such as the OPM hack,12 and creates a decisional framework for choosing
the best response. This Note analyzes the wide range of possible
responses—from full-out “kinetic”13 war to doing nothing—and
determines the best response based on the circumstances surrounding the
breach. The factors that should be analyzed in determining the correct
response are: the actor who committed the breach, the information taken,
and the potential uses for that information.
Analyzing the factors requires a distinction between different types of
cyber operations. All too often, all types of cyber activities are grouped
under the term cyberattack.14 However there is a distinction between
cyberattacks, cybercrime, cyberterrorism, cyber hacktivism, cyber
intrusions, and other cybervandalism.15
There have been many definitions of cyberattack. Yale Law School
Professor of International Law Oona Hathaway argues that “[a] cyberattack consists of any action taken to undermine the functions of a
computer network for a political or national security purpose.”16
Professor Hathaway goes on to distinguish a cyberattack from cyber
espionage, but her argument lacks significant distinction. By claiming
that “[t]o ‘undermine the function’ of a computer system, an actor must
do more than passively observe a computer network or copy data,”
Professor Hathaway ignores the fact that by gaining access to a computer
9. Juan Cayón Peña & Luis Armando García, The Critical Role of Education in Every
Cyber Defense Strategy, 41 N. KY. L. REV. 459, 465 (2014).
10. Id.
11. Id.
PERS.
MGMT.,
12. Cybersecurity
Incidents:
What
Happened,
OFF.
https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/#WhatHappened (last visited Jan.
23, 2017).
13. In this context, “kinetic war” refers to warfare with traditional physical actions, such as
bombing and shooting, as opposed to warfare that would lack such effects (i.e., information
warfare).
14. See P.W. SINGER & ALLAN FRIEDMAN, CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERWAR: WHAT
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 67–69 (2014) (“Essentially, what people too often do when
discussing ‘cyberattacks’ is bundle together a variety of like and unlike activities, simply because
they involve Internet-related technology.”).
15. See Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Cyberwar: Concept, Status Quo, and Limitations, CSS
ANALYSIS IN SECURITY POL’Y, Apr. 2010, at 1, 1–2.
16. Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 826 (2012).
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network, the actor has at some point undermined the function of that
system.17 This is especially true with classified networks where one of
the primary functions of the network is to keep the information on it
secure.18 However, the distinction that Professor Hathaway makes
between defining cyberattack in terms of its objective rather than by its
means is valuable and worth pointing out.19 By defining a cyberattack by
its objective, it demonstrates that cyber operations can span multiple
domains.20
We will continue to follow an objective- or intention-based approach
in our definition of cyberattack, but will consider violence the objective.
Therefore, we will define a cyberattack as a “cyber operation . . . that is
reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons, or damage or
destruction to objects.”21 This definition encompasses what the
Department of Defense (DOD) has used to describe as cyber operations
that constitute a use of force under jus ad bellum22 and the United Nations
(U.N.) Article 2(4).23 Integrating the definition of cyberattack to meet the
requirements of use of force allows it to be easily distinguished from
other types of harmful cyber activities.
A cyber intrusion, as distinguished from a cyberattack, can be
classified as a “covert action[] employing small-scale operations against
a specific computer, computer system, or user, whose individual
compromise would have significant value.”24 Cyber intrusions, the focus
of this Note, include data breaches, cyber espionage, and hacking. Cyber
espionage, or the targeting of computers and networks to obtain otherwise
confidential information,25 is not deemed to be a violation of international
law and is conducted by the United States.26 Whether a particular cyber

17. Id. at 830 (emphasis omitted).
18. See id.
19. Id. at 826–28.
20. Id. (explaining that cyber operations can be used to assist in controlling the traditional
domains of air, land, and sea).
21. Gary D. Solis, Cyber Warfare, 219 MIL. L. REV. 1, 12 (2014).
22. Jus ad bellum is the criteria used to determine whether engaging in a certain armed
conflict is just. See Jus Ad Bellum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). For a more detailed
explanation of jus ad bellum and cyber warfare, see Hathaway et al., supra note 16, at 839–43.
23. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 998–99 (2015).
24. Solis, supra note 21, at 13.
25. SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 93; Luke Pelican, Peacetime Cyber-Espionage:
A Dangerous but Necessary Game, 20 J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 363, 365 (2012).
26. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 23, at 999 (“[T]o the extent that cyber operations
resemble traditional intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, such as unauthorized
intrusions into computer networks solely to acquire information, then such cyber operations would
likely be treated similarly under international law. The United States conducts such activities via
cyberspace, and such operations are governed by long-standing and well-established
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intrusion is classified as cyber espionage or something more will be an
important determination for developing an appropriate response.
The focus of this Note is on responses that the government should take
against a perpetrator of a cyber intrusion and not on the responses that
help those affected by the breach.27 This Note develops a framework for
analyzing and responding to breaches against the government and does
not address breaches against private institutions.28 This Note will lay out
the decisional framework in three parts. First, it will look at two recent
breaches against the government: the hack by the Chinese against the
OPM and the public release of U.S. Military service members’ personal
information by a terrorist hacker.29 The responses to these two cases
illustrate the bookends for the array of responses the government could
take.30 Part II looks at the different factors that should be analyzed in
assessing the severity of a breach. Part II begins by discussing the
different types of actors and then explores the types of data taken and its
potential uses. Part III examines the different responses that the
government could take. Lastly this Note concludes by putting together
the decisional framework.
considerations, including the possibility that those operations could be interpreted as a hostile
act.” (footnote omitted)).
27. See Joe Davidson, Months After OPM Hack, 21.5 Million People Are Formally Being
Advised, and Offered Help, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2015, at A19 (explaining the actions that OPM
was taking to help those potentially affected by the theft of their personal information). See
generally Jon L. Mills & Kelsey Harclerode, Privacy, Mass Intrusion, and the Modern Data
Breach, 69 FLA. L. REV. 771 (explaining the various privacy laws and legal options for those
affected by data breaches).
28. Although excluding breaches against private institutions, it includes government
information held by private institutions. For example, the Chinese government stole classified
information regarding the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. China’s Cyber-Theft Jet Fighter,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2014, 7:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-cyber-theft-jetfighter-1415838777. Although the data breach was against Lockheed Martin’s information
systems and not the U.S. government’s, the breach stole U.S. secrets and thus is classified as a
data breach against the government. Id. However, it will not encompass breaches against private
institutions that had government employees’ personal information stolen if the private institution
had the government employees’ information because they were a private consumer. This means
that this Note will not discuss the Target or Ashley Madison breaches, even though government
employees had their personal information stolen as a result. See Cory Bennett, 15,000 Government
Emails Revealed in Ashley Madison Leak, HILL (Aug. 19, 2015, 9:55 AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/251431-ashley-madison-leak-appears-real-includesthousands-of-government-emails (explaining that more than 15,000 of the email accounts
revealed belonged to government employees and military members).
29. See infra Part I.
30. The Obama administration has not publicly responded to the Chinese for their theft of
personal information demonstrating that, although unwise, the government can choose to do
nothing. See Sanger, supra note 8. At the other end of the spectrum, the government used a drone
strike against a terrorist who published online service members’ personal information. See De
Freytas-Tamura, supra note 1.
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I. RECENT CASES
This Part analyzes two recent data breaches against the U.S.
government and the actions that the government took in response to those
breaches.
A. The Office of Personnel Management Hacks
On June 4, 2015, OPM released a memorandum stating that sensitive
personal information for approximately four million federal employees
was stolen from OPM computer systems.31 Further investigations
revealed two separate but related intrusions into OPM computer
systems.32 Those intrusions compromised sensitive information on more
than twenty-one million current and former federal employees.33 The
United States government has refused to publicly name a culprit.34
However, some public officials, such as the Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper, have acknowledged that China is
responsible.35 The government has done nothing publicly to respond.36
The Obama Administration had the difficult task of determining the
appropriate response for different types of cyberattacks.37
B. Daesh Hacking and the Drone-Strike Response
On August 15, 2015, the terrorist group Daesh, also known as ISIS
(Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant), or IS (Islamic State),38 released online a second list containing

31. News Release, Office of Pers. Mgmt., OPM to Notify Employees of Cybersecurity
Incident (June 4, 2015), https://www.opm.gov/news/releases/2015/06/opm-to-notify-employeesof-cybersecurity-incident/.
32. Cybersecurity Incidents: What Happened, supra note 12.
33. Id.
34. Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Decides Against Publicly Blaming China for Data Hack, WASH.
POST (July 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-avoidsblaming-china-in-data-theft-seen-as-fair-game-in-espionage/2015/07/21/03779096-2eee-11e58353-1215475949f4_story.html.
35. Sanger, supra note 8 (quoting James Clapper as saying, “you have to salute the Chinese
for what they did”).
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. I chose to call the group Daesh, which is the acronym created from the group’s name in
Arabic (“al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham”). The terrorist organization does not like being
called Daesh because it has negative connotations in Arabic. Faisal Irshaid, Isis, Isil, IS, or Daesh?
One Group, Many Names, BBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-27994277. I prefer to not give the organization legitimacy by calling them ISIS, ISIL, or IS,
because their goal of establishing an authoritarian Islamic state is based on a perverted form of
Islam. See id.
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military service members’ personal information.39 The list was reportedly
distributed by well-known Daesh hacker Junaid Hussain.40 Hussain, a
British citizen, was the leader of a group known as the Cyber Caliphate,
which provided online recruiting and hacking for Daesh.41 Additionally,
he took responsibility for hacking into U.S. Central Command’s Twitter
and YouTube accounts and posting threats against military members.42
On August 25, 2015, the U.S. Military killed Hussain in a targeted drone
strike.43 The debate over the legality of using targeted drone strikes is
outside the scope of this Note.44 However, the use of kinetic force, to
include drone strikes, is an option for responding to data breaches.
Although there are differences between Hussain’s actions and the
OPM hack, the responses to each, targeted killing and doing nothing, are
extreme opposites and show the lack of any clear government policy for
responding to data breaches.45 The decision matrix introduced in this
Note is a starting point to rectify this lack of policy.
II. DECIDING WHAT TO DO MADE EASY—A DECISION MATRIX
The decision matrix introduced below should be used by government
decision makers to determine the appropriate response to data breaches.
Doing so will limit the indecisiveness and confusion expressed by the
Obama administration.46 The decision matrix, depicted in Figure 1,
intersects actors of the breach with the severity of the information stolen.
The “actors” are listed along the Y-axis and the “severity of the
information stolen” is listed along the X-axis. The inside boxes list
Roman Numerals that correspond to the appropriate response options
based upon the two factors associated with the breach. The factors and
responses are analyzed in Parts III and IV, respectively, but it is important
to introduce the decision matrix beforehand to provide context.
Once the government obtains the appropriate information, using the
decision matrix is easy. The first step is to identify the actor and
determine to which Y-axis classification they belong.47 The next step is
39. ISIS Claims to Release Another U.S. Military “Hit List,” CBS NEWS (Aug. 12, 2015,
1:38 PM) [hereinafter CBS NEWS], http://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-claims-to-releaseanother-us-military-hit-list/.
40. Id.; see also De Freytas-Tamura, supra note 1.
41. See De Freytas-Tamura, supra note 1.
42. Dan Lamothe, Islamic State Loyalists Hack U.S. Military Social Media, WASH. POST,
Jan. 13, 2015, at A01.
43. De Freytas-Tamura, supra note 1.
44. See generally Oren Gross, The New Way of War: Is There a Duty to Use Drones?, 67
FLA. L. REV. 1, 25–30 (2015).
45. See De Freytas-Tamura, supra note 1; Sanger, supra note 8.
46. See Sanger, supra note 8.
47. See infra Part III (explaining the different classifications of actors who conduct data
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to determine the severity of the breach. The severity, which is rated from
insignificant to extreme, is determined through the totality of the
circumstances—focusing on the information stolen and the potential uses
of that information.48 The box where the actor and severity level intersect
contains the appropriate types of responses that can be taken. The types
of potential responses, as described below, often encompass many
different actions the government could take and should be scrutinized
with the specifics of the actor and breach.
Figure 1
Severity of Information Taken

Terrorist

Insignificant

Negligible

Moderate

II. or VI.

II., IV., & V. II., IV., & V.

Extensive

Extreme

I., II., IV., & I., II., IV., &
V.
V.

III.

II. or III. or IV. II., III., & IV.

I., II., III., &
IV.

V. or VI.

V.

V.

V.

II. & V.

Hacktivist V. or VI.

V.

V.

V.

II. & V.

Actor

State Actor III. or VI.

Criminal
Groups

Recommended Actions
I. Kinetic Action
II. Retaliatory Countermeasures
III. Diplomatic Action
IV. Economic Sanctions
V. Criminal Prosecution

breaches against the United States).
48. See infra Part IV (explaining the different types of information stolen and how to
determine its severity level).
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III. FACTORS FOR ANALYZING THE SEVERITY OF A BREACH
This Part begins by looking at the different types of actors who
commit data breaches. Next, this Part analyzes the types of data that can
be taken from a data breach and the potential uses for that data. This
information is then used to assign a severity level to the breach. The
severity level is based on assessing the totality of the circumstances for
each factor. Once a severity level has been assigned, the potential
responses that correlate with that level can be chosen.
A. Actors
The first factor to analyze in determining the severity of the intrusion
is the actor. This information will not always be readily available as
attribution is extremely difficult in cyber operations.49 This is so because
it is easy for hackers to mask where they are, what their nationality is,
and what organization they represent.50 If an actor can be identified, the
actor can be classified into one of two main groups: state or non-state
actor. Determining whether a known perpetrator of a cyber intrusion is a
state actor is relatively straightforward—was the perpetrator of the attack
acting on behalf of a state government? Non-state actors encompass many
different types of groups including individuals, terrorist organizations,
belligerents,51 and others. The Government Accountability Office
(GAO), which reports on cybersecurity for Congress, defines the types of
attackers by their motive rather than by their means.52 The GAO breaks
up actors into six different categories: bot-network operators, criminal
groups, hackers/hacktivists, insiders, nations, and terrorists.53 Although
each group is defined by motive, the groups are not mutually exclusive.54
This Note will focus on state actors, terrorists, criminal groups, and
hacktivists. We will not look at bot-network operators nor insiders
because they fit within the other groups.55
49. See SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 73–74 (explaining that it is easy to obscure
where a cyber operation originated from, thus making it very difficult to determine who is
responsible).
50. Id.
51. See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 23, at 102–06 (describing the different types
of belligerents and their qualifications).
52. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-758T, INFORMATION SECURITY:
CYBER THREATS AND DATA BREACHES ILLUSTRATE NEED FOR STRONGER CONTROLS ACROSS
FEDERAL AGENCIES 4 (2015).
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. See id. The GAO defines a bot-network operator as someone who uses a network of
remotely controlled systems to coordinate attacks. Id. However, bot-net operation is more a
method of hacking than a type of actor. Terrorists, hacktivists, state actors, or criminals could all
use bot-networks to conduct their attacks and therefore there is no need for the distinction in this

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 6

968

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

Classifying the actor is important because different classes of actors
should receive different types of treatment based on the information
stolen and its potential uses. This is evident through the two examples
provided earlier.56 When Hussain, a terrorist, stole personal information
of military members, he was sought out and killed in a drone strike.57
Alternatively, when the Chinese government stole personal information
of federal employees, many of whom were military members, there was
no official response.58 This distinction is also important because the
government should be far less likely to respond with kinetic force against
a state actor than a non-state actor.
1. State Actors
State actors primarily use cyber intrusions for espionage.59 However,
some advanced nations such as China and Russia are developing
sophisticated information warfare “doctrine, programs, and capabilities,”
which would allow them to use cyber weapons to disrupt and destroy vital
assets.60 Cyber espionage by state actors has a major distinction from
traditional espionage in that traditional espionage usually required
someone to be put in harm’s way—such as a spy or surveillance aircraft.61
In contrast, cyber espionage can be conducted from the relative safety of
the spy’s own home millions of miles away.62 This ability to spy from
safety, combined with the attribution problem,63 decreases the deterrent
factor of being caught.64 Although China65 and Russia66 have received
most of the criticism for cyber espionage, many countries have the ability

Note. Id. Similarly, insiders reveal more about the “how” than the “who.” Id. To further explain,
any insider who uses the information would be classified as a criminal, terrorist, hacktivist, or spy
depending on how they use the information, and thus there is again no need for the distinction. Id.
56. See supra Part I (discussing recent hacks against the government).
57. De Freytas-Tamura, supra note 1.
58. Sanger, supra note 8.
59. See Pelican, supra note 25, at 365.
60. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 52, at 4.
61. Pelican, supra note 25, at 384.
62. See id.
63. See SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 73–74.
64. See Pelican, supra note 25, at 384 (explaining that the risk of harm to the spy or host
state is minimal if they are discovered because they are operating from a foreign country).
65. See Paul Eckert & Daniel Magnowski, Kissinger, Huntsman: U.S., China Need Cyber
Détente, REUTERS (June 14, 2011, 2:48 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/15/uschina-kissinger-cyber-idUSTRE75D62Q20110615.
66. See Tom Vanden Brook & Michael Winter, Hackers Penetrated Pentagon Email, USA
TODAY (Aug. 7, 2015, 12:19 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/08/06/
russia-reportedly-hacks-pentagon-email-system/31228625/ (blaming Russia for taking down the
Joint Chiefs of Staff’s unclassified network for two weeks).
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to, and do, conduct cyber espionage.67 Cyber intrusions by state actors
are difficult to respond to because of the complex nature of relationships
among countries, especially if the intrusion was against a friendly
nation.68
2. Terrorists
A second category of actor is terrorists. Terrorists are individuals or
groups who use violence, or the threat of violence, to intimidate civilian
populations, influence government policy through coercion, or alter
government conduct.69 It is important to note that to be classified as a
terrorist, one must use or threaten to use violence.70 Therefore, someone
cannot be classified as a terrorist simply by conducting data breaches,
even if their aims are similar to terrorists. Thus, data breaches are simply
a tool used by terrorists to help them in their objectives of mass civilian
panic, political manipulation, and governmental disruption.71
Terrorists often use cyber intrusions to generate funds,72 recruit
individuals to their cause, damage public morale, or threaten national
security.73 Terrorist organizations steal personal data from individuals
and sell that information or use it fraudulently to acquire funds.74
Additionally, terrorists can use stolen identities to access government
facilities, avoid detection, or purchase dangerous supplies such as
firearms.75 Recently, terrorist cyber breaches against the U.S.

67. See Siobhan Gorman, Navy Hacking Blamed on Iran Tied to H-P Contract, WALL ST.
J. (Mar. 6, 2014, 7:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023047328045794
23611224344876 (discussing an Iranian hack of a Navy and Marine Corps unclassified network);
see also OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 23, at 999.
68. See Eyder Peralta, Germany Closes Probe into Alleged U.S. Hacking of Merkel’s Phone,
NPR (June 12, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/12/413866194/germanycloses-probe-into-alleged-u-s-hacking-of-merkels-phone (explaining that the “allegations and
probe strained the relations between the two allies”).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2012); Terrorist, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331.
71. See id.
72. CATHERINE A. THEOHARY & JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41674,
TERRORIST USE OF THE INTERNET: INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN CYBERSPACE 2 (2011)
(“Cybercrime has now surpassed international drug trafficking as a terrorist financing
enterprise.”).
73. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 52, at 4.
74. DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE HOMELAND SEC. COMM., 109TH CONG., IDENTITY THEFT &
TERRORISM 9–10 (2005).
75. Id. (explaining how terrorists have created fake identities using stolen information to
remain undetected or to gain access to government facilities).
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government76 were conducted to damage public morale,77 demonstrate
power, 78 and recruit lone wolf actors to their cause.79
3. Criminal Groups
Criminal groups are a third type of actor that attempts to breach
government data systems.80 The GAO defines cyber-criminal groups as
those who “seek to attack systems for monetary gain.”81 This definition,
however, can cross over with other types of actors, particularly state
actors and terrorists.82 Therefore the distinction should be that cybercriminals’ ultimate goal is monetary gain, whereas state actors and
terrorists have additional objectives. Claims against the Chinese
government for trade secret theft from U.S. companies is a prime example
of a state actor that attacks computer systems for financial gain.83
Although cyber criminals are more likely to go after individuals and
businesses,84 they could still steal information from the government for
monetary gain.85 Just as personally identifiable information (PII) can be
76. See CBS NEWS, supra note 39.
77. See Ashley Frantz, As ISIS Threats Online Persist, Military Families Rethink Online
Lives, CNN (Mar. 23, 2015, 7:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/23/us/online-threat-isis-ustroops/ (quoting military spouses who now fear attacks against them as a result of Daesh posting
their names and addresses online).
78. See Jenny Vaughan, US Marine Corps Urges ‘Vigilance’ After Online Islamist Threat,
YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 22, 2015, 9:26 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/us-marine-corps-urgesvigilance-hacking-threat-103621598.html (quoting NATO Commander Phillip Breedlove calling
the hacks an attempt by the organization to detract attention away from their recent military
defeats).
79. Pamela Brown & Jim Sciutto, FBI Warns Military of ISIS Threat, CNN (Dec. 1, 2014
8:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/01/politics/fbi-warns-military-of-isis-threat/ (“The FBI
issued a warning Sunday to members of the U.S. military that ISIS is calling for attacks against
them, according to a law enforcement source, saying that ‘overseas based individuals are looking
for like-minded individuals in the U.S. to carry out these attacks.’”).
80. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 52, at 4.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. See Indictment at 1–2, United States v. Dong, No. 14-118 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2014);
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber
Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage (May
19,
2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyberespionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor.
84. See CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, NET LOSSES: ESTIMATING THE GLOBAL COST
OF CYBERCRIME 13 (2014) (“This means that the lost revenues from the theft of IP through hacking
could be almost as much as the value of legitimate IP transactions.”).
85. If the OPM hack was conducted by a non-state actor whose goal was to steal the identity
of the individuals whose information was taken, then that would be cybercrime against the
government, because the information was still stolen from the government. See Dave Lee, Chinese
Man Pleads Guilty to US Military Hack, BBC (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/
news/technology-35888106.
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stolen from individuals or businesses and used for identity theft, the
government is also susceptible to this threat from criminal groups.86
4. Hacktivists
Hacktivists are another category of actor that can be used in
developing a response to a data breach against the government. Hackers
illegally access networks “for the challenge, revenge, stalking, or
monetary gain.”87 Hacktivism “involves the use of technology hacking
mechanisms . . . to effect particular political and/or social change.”88
Although hacktivists seek political change, they are different from
terrorists because they do not use violence to achieve their objectives.
Hacktivists have mixed support often based on their mixed motives.89
The most notable hacking group is Anonymous, a loosely connected
group that conducts cyberattacks for various political and social causes.90
Hacktivists often attack government computers through distributed denial
of service (DDoS)91 attacks, in order to send a political message.92 Data
breaches against the government by hacktivists have been in the news in
the wake of the leaks by Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning and National
Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden.93 Although both
Manning and Snowden have been charged with crimes,94 I have chosen
86. See News Release, Office of Pers. Mgmt., supra note 31 (explaining that individuals
whose personal information was stolen would receive free credit monitoring and identity-theft
protection).
87. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 52, at 4.
88. Xiang Li, Note, Hacktivism and the First Amendment: Drawing the Line Between Cyber
Protests and Crime, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 301, 302 (2013).
89. See id. at 303–04.
90. See id. Anonymous has supported many different social and political causes since its
founding in 2003. Id. However, recently Anonymous and its offshoot, GhostSec, have begun
waging a cyberwar against ISIS by attacking its social media accounts and websites. See Katie
Rogers, Anonymous Hackers Fight ISIS but Reactions Are Mixed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/26/world/europe/anonymous-hackers-fight-isis-but-reactions
-are-mixed.html.
91. A DDoS attack is when a hacker uses multiple computers under their control to send
traffic to a server at a rate faster than the server can handle the traffic, thus denying service to the
server’s intended customers. DDOS, NEWTON’S TELECOM DICTIONARY 349 (25th ed. 2009);
Denial of Service Attack, NEWTON’S TELECOM DICTIONARY, supra, at 357.
92. See Solis, supra note 21, at 36–37 (“[A] small group of individuals located in California,
launched a pre-announced distributed-denial-of-service program against a Pentagon website . . .
as a virtual sit-in.”).
93. See David D. Cole, Assessing the Leakers: Criminals or Heroes?, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY
L. & POL’Y 107, 107 (2015).
94. See Complaint at 1, United States v. Snowden, No. 1:13-CR-265 (E.D. Va. June 14,
2013); Charlie Savage & Emmarie Huetteman, Manning Sentenced to 35 Years for a Pivotal Leak
of U.S. Files, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/us/manningsentenced-for-leaking-government-secrets.html.
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to label them as hacktivists because of their motive—to release
information to the public in order to disclose what they believed to be
immoral or illegal activities by the U.S. government.95
B. Information Taken and Its Potential Uses
The next factor to analyze when developing a response is the
information taken and its potential uses, which is necessary to determine
the seriousness of the breach and therefore how severe the response
should be. A wide range of information could be stolen from the
government, from PII96 to nuclear codes. The uses of the information will
also be dependent on the actor who stole the information.97 As an
example, PII stolen from the government by a cybercriminal would likely
be used to make money through identity theft,98 whereas PII stolen by a
terrorist could be used to kill government employees.99
Additionally, the government must look at not only who stole the
information, but also who could acquire the information. For example,
Manning and Snowden both released millions of classified documents.100
However, the danger is not with Manning or Snowden having the
documents but with terrorists or other countries gaining information
regarding U.S. security practices.101
In addition to items taken directly from the government, items stolen
from government contractors should also be considered data breaches
against the government warranting a response. One prominent example
was the hacking of Lockheed Martin, which resulted in the theft of plans
and specifications of the new F-35 aircraft.102 Data breaches against
certain political groups should also be considered as a breach against the
government if they have the potential to harm U.S. interests. An example
of this would be the hack against the Democratic National Committee,
where hacktivists and state actors allegedly attempted to influence U.S.

95. Cole, supra note 93, at 108.
96. See News Release, Office of Pers. Mgmt., supra note 31 (explaining that employees and
contractors for the federal government had their PII stolen in a cybersecurity incident).
97. See supra Section II.A.
98. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
99. See CBS NEWS, supra note 39; Frantz, supra note 77.
100. Cole, supra note 93, at 107.
101. See Jason Leopold, Official Reports on the Damage Caused by Edward Snowden’s
Leaks Are Totally Redacted, VICE: NEWS (Feb. 25, 2015, 12:30 PM),
https://news.vice.com/article/official-reports-on-the-damage-caused-by-edward-snowdens-leaks
-are-totally-redacted (“Snowden’s actions are likely to have lethal consequences for our troops in
the field.”). The report that Chairman Rogers was basing this statement on was completely
redacted for the media except for subheadings. Id.
102. China’s Cyber-Theft Jet Fighter, supra note 28.
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elections.103 Thus, the more sensitive the stolen information is, and more
harm it could cause, the more severe the response should be. The
assessment should be specific to each breach and the circumstances
around it. After the fact-specific analysis, the government should rate the
severity as insignificant, negligible, moderate, extensive, or extreme.
IV. POTENTIAL RESPONSES
As stated previously, responses range from kinetic warfare to inaction.
These options are themselves at the extremes and should only be used in
extraordinary circumstances, even though they seem to be the norm under
the current policy—or lack thereof.104 Other possible responses include
criminal prosecution,105 financial sanctions,106 diplomatic measures,107
and counter-breaches.108 Cybersecurity expert Peter Singer believes the
best option for the United States is to build a strong defense.109 Although
having a strong cybersecurity posture is important, it is not a solution for
how to respond to cyber intrusions.110 Cyber defenses are similar to home
security: you can have an alarm system, a fence, a dog, and a
neighborhood watch, but if someone really wants to break into your home
they will still find a way. Instead, having a framework for choosing an
103. David Sanger & Charlie Savage, U.S. Says Russia Directed Hacks to Influence
Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/politics/usformally-accuses-russia-of-stealing-dnc-emails.html.
104. See Sanger, supra note 8 (explaining that the U.S. has deemed they need to respond to
China’s hack of OPM records, but because of a lack of policy they do not know how or when to
do so).
105. See Indictment, supra note 83, at 1–2 (indicting five Chinese People’s Liberation Army
hackers for stealing trade secrets from U.S. companies).
106. Carol Morello, U.S. Sanctions North Korea over Sony Hack, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 3,
2015, at A4 (discussing a new Executive Order imposing financial sanctions against North Korea
in response to their hacking of Sony).
107. See Aaron Burnstein, Trade Secrecy as an Instrument of National Security? Rethinking
the Foundations of Economic Espionage, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 933, 986–87 (2009) (advocating for
countries to openly share information, thus reducing the incentive for cyber espionage); Eckert &
Magnowski, supra note 65 (explaining the need for diplomatic resolution to escalating cyber
conflict).
108. See Sanger, supra note 8.
109. Symposium, Talking Foreign Policy: A Discussion on Cyber Warfare, 47 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 319, 322–23 (2015).
110. See Ellen Nakashima, Cyber Chief: Efforts to Deter Attacks Against the U.S. Are Not
Working, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/head-of-cyber-command-us-may-need-to-boost-offensive-cyber-powers/2015/03/19/
1ad79a34-ce4e-11e4-a2a7-9517a3a70506_story.html (quoting Admiral Michael Rogers,
Commander of U.S. Cyber Command and Director of the National Security Agency, in his
testimony to Congress that offensive cyber capabilities need to be improved for a stronger
deterrent effect because “a purely defensive, reactive strategy will be both late to need and
incredibly resource-intense”).
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appropriate response signals to potential hackers that the United States
will respond and take action, creating a deterrent effect.111
Certain responses to cyber actions may raise questions regarding their
legality under international law as well as their authorization under
domestic law.112 The United Nations Charter Article 2(4) states: “All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations.”113 The question then becomes what, if anything, in the
cyber realm is the use of force?114 The DOD Law of War Manual explains
the difficulties of this question:
[C]yber operations could be a non-forcible means or method
of conducting hostilities (such as information gathering),
and would be regulated as such under rules applicable to
non-forcible means and methods of warfare. Other cyber
operations could be used to create effects that amount to an
attack and would be regulated under the rules on conducting
attacks. Moreover, another set of challenging issues may
arise when considering whether a particular cyber operation
might be regarded as a seizure or destruction of enemy
property and should be assessed as such.115
This description exhibits the difficulty in determining what can be
111. Compare Sanger, supra note 8 (“One of the conclusions we’ve reached is that we need
to be a bit more public about our responses, and one reason is deterrence . . . . We need to disrupt
and deter what our adversaries are doing in cyberspace, and that means you need a full range of
tools to tailor a response.”), with Aaron Brantly, Ambiguous Deterrence, CYBER DEF. REV. (Jan.
23, 2015), http://www.cyberdefensereview.org/2015/01/23/ambiguous-deterrence/ (confirming
claims by high-level officials “that ambiguity of response facilitates deterrence” as accurate).
112. See generally Hathaway et al., supra note 16, at 841–57 (explaining how cyberattacks
fit into the jus ad bellum and jus in bello frameworks as well as discussing how cyberattacks are
governed under non-law of war frameworks); Tyler K. Lowe, Mapping the Matrix: Defining the
Balance Between Executive Action and Legislative Regulation in the New Battlefield of
Cyberspace, 17 SCHOLAR 63, 73–74 (2015) (explaining that Congress has not explicitly authorized
cyberwar, but has implicitly authorized Executive Action authority for offensive cyber
operations); Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of
Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 429 (explaining that how a country defines “force” and
“aggression” under the U.N. charter is important in determining the legality of cyberattacks).
113. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
114. Many experts have asked and attempted to answer this question. See, e.g., Hathaway et
al., supra note 16, at 841–57; Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as
Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), in
HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE, Dec. 2012, at 1, 3–4 (“[C]yber activities that proximately result in death,
injury, or significant destruction would likely be viewed as a use of force.” (emphasis omitted));
Waxman, supra note 112, at 429.
115. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 23, at 997 (footnotes omitted).
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classified as the use of force.116 The easy answer is that cyberattacks that
result in death or physical destruction are a clear use of force.117 However,
the difficulty is whether cyber actions that do not rise to the level of
physical destruction or death can be classified as a use of force.118
Whether a cyber intrusion is classified as a use of force under Article
2(4) is important because it establishes whether a country may respond
in self-defense.119 The U.N. Charter allows any country to defend itself
against any armed attack,120 however there is much debate about what
level of force equates to an armed attack.121 The International Court of
Justice has claimed that not all uses of force equate to an armed attack,
but instead, “it [is] necessary to distinguish the most grave forms of the
use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave
forms.”122 Therefore, classifying a cyber operation as a use of force
would not automatically allow a country to respond in self-defense under
international law.123
Certain responses, excluding kinetic force, would still be available to
respond to cyber intrusions that constitute force but do not rise to the level
of an armed attack.124 Therefore, the United States would be able to
respond in kind if it were a victim to a cyber intrusion.125 If the act against
the United States was not considered a use of force, then the response in
kind would also not be considered a use of force.126 If the original
intrusion was a use of force, then the United States would likely be
justified in responding with a similar use of force in the cyber realm. 127
116. See Waxman, supra note 112, at 421–22 (providing several hypothetical cyberattack
situations that demonstrate the difficulty in determining which could be classified as a use of force
under international law).
117. Antonia Chayes, Rethinking Warfare: The Ambiguity of Cyber Attacks, 6 HARV. NAT’L
SECURITY J. 474, 507 (2015); see also Koh, supra note 114, at 3–4.
118. See Hathaway et al., supra note 16, at 841–57 (“[T]here may be acts that violate Article
2(4)’s prohibition on the use or threat of force that do not rise to the level of an armed attack, and
hence do not trigger the right of self-defense under Article 51.”).
119. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations . . . .”). But see Hathaway et al., supra note 16, at 841–57.
120. U.N. Charter art. 51.
121. Hathaway et al., supra note 16, at 841–57.
122. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 191 (June 27).
123. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; U.N. Charter art. 51; Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 191.
124. Hathaway et al., supra note 16, at 845 & n.109 (“Where they may not resort to defensive
force under Article 51 . . . states may be permitted to respond with retorsions or nonforceful
countermeasures within carefully proscribed legal limits.”).
125. Id.
126. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4
127. See Waxman, supra note 112, at 434–35.
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From a policy perspective, the U.S. government is likely satisfied with a
vague international definition of “force” in the cyber context because it
allows them to conduct cyber operations of their own.128
Essentially, cyber operations under international law can be broken
down into three categories: those that do not classify as the use of force,
those that are the use of force but not an armed attack, and those actions
that constitute an armed attack.129 Although there are difficulties in
determining whether a certain cyber intrusion should be classified as a
use of force or an armed attack, the most effective way to classify such
actions is to analogize the results to those of conventional actions. 130 To
state it differently:
In order for a [cyber operation] to be considered an armed
attack it has to look like one; and the way to tell is by the
results of the attack. If the consequences of a [cyber
operation] are similar to those that result from an armed
attack in its traditional meaning—loss of life or destruction
of property, then it is in point of fact an armed attack . . . .131
Using this approach to define when a cyber operation can be
considered a use of force continues our theme of using effects- and endstate based definitions.132
Even if the United States is authorized under international law to
conduct retaliatory cyber operations, there is still the debate about
whether Congressional approval is needed.133 A full discussion on which
branch of government has the authority to authorize the use of force is
beyond the scope of this Note.134 Although Congress has not expressly
provided any authorization for a cyber use of force, Congress did
“recognize[] the ability of the Executive Branch to conduct offensive
128. Id. at 435 (“[W]hile very concerned about U.S. vulnerabilities to [] [cyber] activities
and eager to prevent them, U.S. planners may be reluctant to draw boundaries too tight, lest those
boundaries impede their own ability to infiltrate and extract information from others’
systems . . . .”); see also OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 23, at 999; Nakashima, supra note
110.
129. Osnat Davidson, A Legal Analysis of Computer Network Attacks Under International
Law, 3 ISR. DEF. FORCES L. REV. 70, 75 (2008).
130. Id. at 81.
131. Id. at 79–81.
132. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
133. For a more in-depth look at which branch of government has the power to authorize
offensive cyber operations, see Eric Lorber, Comment, Executive Warmaking Authority and
Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential
Power?, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 961, 962–63 (2013).
134. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
284–86, 373–76 (3d ed. 2006) (explaining the scope of Congressional and Executive power in the
War Powers context).
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cyber warfare . . . .”135 Therefore, the Executive Branch likely has the
power to retaliate to any cyber intrusion taken against it, even if the
original act is not classified as a use of force.136 We will now look at the
different options the government could take: criminal prosecutions,
financial sanctions, diplomatic measures, retaliatory countermeasures, or
kinetic actions.137
A. Criminal Prosecutions
Criminal prosecution would only work in limited situations where
individual attribution is available and a trial would not implicate U.S.
countermeasures.138 The United States has two primary laws under which
it could charge individuals for cyber espionage: the Espionage Act of
1917139 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).140 The United
States has the ability to charge citizens and noncitizens under the
Espionage Act of 1917 even if the espionage is committed outside of the
United States.141 Although cyber espionage is not directly referenced in
the act, the law’s applicability can be inferred through the broad
definition of espionage.142
The CFAA is even more applicable to these types of actions, as
“cyberexploitation was a focus of the act.”143 The CFAA, although
originally designed to protect government computers from unauthorized
access,144 makes it a felony to access a computer without authorization,
or in excess of authorization, to obtain government information.145
Although, there has never been any ruling on whether the CFAA could

135. Lowe, supra note 112, at 73 (quoting the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012: “Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capability, and upon
direction by the President may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation,
Allies and interests . . . .”).
136. Lowe, supra note 112, at 74.
137. The sixth option the government could take, and often does take, is to do nothing.
However, this option requires no explanation.
138. Sanger, supra note 8 (“Intelligence officials say that any legal case could result in
exposing American intelligence operations inside China . . . .”); see also SINGER & FRIEDMAN,
supra note 14, at 72–80 (explaining the problem of attribution in the cyber context).
139. Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–99 (2012)).
140. Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030); see also
Pelican, supra note 25, at 374–76. For a more detailed background on the CFAA, see Trace
Jackson, Note, Can Jailbreaking Put You in Jail, Broke?, 68 FLA. L. REV. 631 (2016).
141. See United States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196, 198 (D. Mass. 1985).
142. See 18 U.S.C. § 794 (inferring cyber espionage to fall under the act of “communicates,
delivers, or transmits”).
143. Pelican, supra note 25, at 376 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1), (d)(2)).
144. Jackson, supra note 140, at 635.
145. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
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be applied to actions committed abroad,146 the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001147 amended several criminal statutes to allow for extraterritorial
applicability to cyber actions against the United States from abroad.148
Although criminal charges are available to known hackers, there are
many issues that complicate this response.149 First, there is the issue of
extraditing the alleged hackers to the United States for trial.150 Since it is
likely the individuals the United States would want to prosecute for data
breaches are from countries who are not friendly to us, it is unlikely that
those countries would be willing to extradite their citizens.151 Even
countries that have extradition treaties may be unlikely to extradite
individuals, just as Hong Kong refused to extradite Edward Snowden
before he left there for Russia.152
Second, a trial could potentially involve the United States having to
prove how the foreign adversary bypassed security and stole the
information.153 This could result in the publication of the United States’
security protocols as well as tactics that worked for the defendant—both
are items that should not be made public.154
Although criminal prosecutions for corporate espionage have been
successful, criminal prosecutions for cyber espionage against the U.S.
government are more difficult to establish.155 In May 2014, the
146. Pelican, supra note 25, at 376 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1), (d)(2)).
147. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1030; Hathaway et al., supra note 16, at 875 (“The statute banning
computer fraud was likewise amended as part of the USA PATRIOT Act to provide for
extraterritorial applicability.”).
149. See supra notes 138–45 and accompanying text.
150. See Paul Mozur, China Questions Evidence Used in U.S. Cybercrimes Indictment,
WALL ST. J. (May 29, 2014, 12:03 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-defense-ministryquestions-evidence-used-by-u-s-to-indict-five-peoples-liberation-army-officers-for-cybercrimes1401359575 (explaining how the Chinese government refuses to accept responsibility for the
alleged hacking and that the United States commits the same acts).
151. See 31A AM. JUR. 2D Extradition § 14, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2015)
(explaining that an extradition treaty is required between two countries in order for either country
to be able to extradite potential defendants).
152. Eleni Himaras et al., Snowden Lands in Moscow as Hong Kong Rejects U.S. Warrant,
BLOOMBERG (June 23, 2013, 11:26 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-0623/snowden-leaves-hong-kong-as-u-s-seeks-his-extradition.
153. See Sanger, supra note 8.
154. In almost every section, the CFAA has the element of “access[ing] a protected computer
without authorization.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). Unless the defendant were to stipulate this
element of the crime, the prosecution would have to prove that they knew the particular defendant
accessed the protected computer. Id. This would likely result in the U.S. disclosing how they were
hacked, potentially creating a blueprint for others to emulate.
155. See Sanger, supra note 8 (“Intelligence officials say that any legal case could result in
exposing American intelligence operations inside China . . . .”).
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Department of Justice indicted five Chinese People’s Liberation Army
hackers for stealing trade secrets from various U.S. companies.156 This
was the first time the U.S. government had indicted known state hackers
for trade secret theft.157 However, if the actor is acting on behalf of a
foreign government and is stealing government information, then it is no
longer trade secret theft but is instead a form of government espionage.158
Espionage is generally held not to be a violation of international law, but
rather is a violation of the target country’s laws.159 Criminal prosecution
against state actors is a risk because it is likely the United States is
conducting similar actions against that nation, and therefore the other
nation could reciprocate the charges.160
Hacktivism, on the other hand, is a type of data breach that can be
deterred through criminal prosecution. The United States has sought to
bring criminal charges against individuals who released classified
government information—most notably Chelsea Manning and Edward
Snowden.161 Although these two cases were situations where the
perpetrator already had access to the information and did not illegally
obtain access,162 the penalties would have been more severe for someone
who, in addition to illegally releasing classified documents, did so by
illegally obtaining access to them.163 Cyber criminals could also be
deterred through criminal prosecution. The CFAA and domestic theft
laws could be used to prosecute cyber criminals who breach government
systems.164
Criminal prosecutions could be used against terrorists. However, this
approach would likely only work for those who support terrorists groups
from within the United States.165 Therefore, criminal prosecutions seem
to work best only if the actor is a hacktivist or cyber-criminal, based in
the United States or a country that has an extradition treaty with the

156. Indictment, supra note 83, at 1–2.
157. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 83.
158. See 70 AM. JUR. 2D Sedition, Etc. § 13, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2015).
159. See Pelican, supra note 25, at 369–70 (concluding after analysis of various legal
scholars’ views, that peacetime espionage is not a violation of international law).
160. Sanger, supra note 8.
161. See Complaint, supra note 94, at 1; Savage & Huetteman, supra note 94.
162. See Cole, supra note 93, at 108 (describing the leaks by Manning and Snowden as
“unauthorized disclosure[s] of classified information”).
163. Manning was sentenced to 35 years for charges of violating the Espionage Act. Savage
& Huetteman, supra note 94. Her sentence could have been even greater if she had additionally
been charged with violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
164. See supra notes 138–45 and accompanying text.
165. The United States has a robust counterterrorism task force, but often lacks the ability to
capture or extradite terrorists who commonly operate from the Middle East and Africa.
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United States, and the trial would not involve the further disclosure of
sensitive information.166
B. Financial Sanctions
A second option for the United States would be the use of economic
and financial sanctions against the perpetrators. Economic sanctions have
the objectives of behavior modification, retribution, or deterrence.167 The
purposes behind sanctions as a response to data breaches would primarily
be behavior modification and deterrence.168 Specifically, sanctions would
be used to modify the behavior of the target of the sanctions and to deter
other actors from acting similarly.169 Although behavior modification and
retribution are commonly overlapping results of economic sanctions, it is
important to state the objective as behavior modification because the
United Nations has “denounced the use of economic sanctions for
retributive purposes.”170 Several studies on the effectiveness of economic
sanctions have concluded that they do not achieve their desired goal.171
However, many of these studies have only looked at the stated objective
of the sanctions and did not look at other effects the sanctions had, which
are commonly effective in producing a desirable outcome for the
imposing country.172
The United States draws its international authority for economic
sanctions from the powers vested in the U.N. Security Council.173
Domestically, the Commerce Clause of the Constitution grants Congress
the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”174 The primary
166. An example of where criminal prosecution worked was with Manning, who was a U.S.
citizen and soldier in Iraq when arrested. Savage & Huetteman, supra note 94. However, the
deterrent effect of Manning’s prosecution was short lived when, during his last week in office,
President Obama commuted Manning’s sentence. Charlie Savage, Chelsea Manning to Be
Released Early as Obama Commutes Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/us/politics/obama-commutes-bulk-of-chelsea-manningssentence.html.
167. KERN ALEXANDER, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 10 (2009).
168. See id.
169. Nicholas Wolfe, Nuclear Chain Reaction: Why Economic Sanctions Are Not Worth the
Public Costs, 27 FLA. J. INT’L L. 1, 4–5 (2015).
170. Id. (citing G.A. Res. 51/242, annex II, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, ¶ 4 (Sept.
26, 1997)).
171. ALEXANDER, supra note 167, at 34–35.
172. Id. at 34–36 (“The measure of the effectiveness of economic sanctions therefore should
not necessarily be assessed in terms of whether they achieve their stated objectives, which may
be only aspirational, but rather should be assessed in terms of whether they perform other
functions, such as communicating to other states and to supportive and opposing groups, or merely
imposing economic costs on the targets in retribution for particular acts or policies.”).
173. G.A. Res. 51/242, supra note 170, ¶ 1.
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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laws authorizing economic sanctions against countries are the Trading
With the Enemy Act of 1917, the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act of 1977, and the Export Administration Act.175 Following
September 11, 2001, the United States implemented several laws and
programs that place financial sanctions on terrorist groups and their
backers.176 This operation is now carried out by the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), whose mission
is to “administer[] and enforce[] economic and trade sanctions based on
U.S. foreign policy and national security goals.”177
Economic sanctions as a response would primarily be limited to state
actors and terrorists. If used as a response against nations, this option
would likely be more symbolic for larger countries but a beneficial
deterrent for smaller countries.178 Additionally, this option would not be
beneficial against countries who are larger trade partners with the United
States, because the sanctions could create economic losses for the United
States.179 Additionally, several scholars have criticized economic
sanctions because they do more harm to the civilians of the target country
than they benefit the sanctioning country.180 However, as stated
previously, economic sanctions have been successful in achieving
beneficial objectives.181
Economic sanctions can also be used as a response to data breaches
by terrorist organizations. Since 2001, OFAC has seized assets and frozen
accounts globally as a method of combatting terrorist financing.182
Although the United States and its allies have sought to freeze financial
accounts for suspected financiers of terrorism, these tactics have been
criticized183 and have become less effective as terrorist organizations
diversify their revenue streams.184 Additionally, as terrorist organizations
175. ALEXANDER, supra note 167, at 92.
176. See id. at 278.
177. About: Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), U.S. DEP’T TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Foreign-Assets
-Control.aspx (last updated Oct. 14, 2016).
178. See NAT’L SEC. & INT’L AFFAIRS DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSAID92-106, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: EFFECTIVENESS AS TOOLS OF FOREIGN POLICY 9 (1992).
179. Id. at 14 (explaining that sanctions raise the cost of commerce for both the target of the
sanctions and the sanctioning nation).
180. Wolfe, supra note 169, at 12–13.
181. ALEXANDER, supra note 167, at 10.
182. Id. at 283–84.
183. See NICHOLAS RYDER, THE FINANCIAL WAR ON TERRORISM: A REVIEW OF COUNTERTERRORIST FINANCING STRATEGIES SINCE 2001, at 84 (2015) (claiming that the ability to freeze the
assets of terrorist supporters “is an ineffective response” and is politically motivated to make it
appear as though the government is doing something to combat terrorism).
184. See Ana Swanson, How the Islamic State Makes Its Money, WASH. POST: WORKBLOG
(Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/18/how-isis-makes-
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become more technologically advanced, stopping their funding has
become more difficult.185 Regardless of the difficulties, this option should
still be used to combat terrorist hacking. Overall, this option is best suited
as a deterrent for small countries and to limit the effectiveness of terrorist
organizations.
C. Diplomacy
The third option available to the United States against hackers who
steal government information is diplomatic measures. This response
encompasses a wide variety of options: open sharing to reduce the
incentive for cyber intrusions,186 agreements with countries that define
the acceptable scope and limits for cyber espionage,187 and treaties and
international cooperation that dictate acceptable actions in the cyber
realm.188 The issue with most of the diplomatic measures is that they do
nothing to punish past offenders. Certain activities, such as direct
agreements with other countries, are beneficial if the country has an
incentive to cooperate with the United States, as many smaller and
developing countries do. However, if the country denies conducting any
type of cyber breach and does not need financial incentives from the
United States, i.e., China and Russia, then these agreements will not
work.189
The current trend is for international cooperation to develop baseline
security measures for groups of nations where there is a mutual need for

its-money/ (explaining how Daesh has avoided having its funding shut down through international
financial freezes by diversifying its revenue stream through the sale of oil, taxation and extortion
in the areas it controls, ransom from kidnapping, sales of antiquities, seizures of Iraqi banks, sales
of looted property, sales and rentals of real estate previously owned by people it has killed,
agriculture, and sale of minerals).
185. See Aaron Brantly, Financing Terror Bit by Bit, COMBATING TERRORISM CTR.
SENTINEL, Oct. 2014, at 1, 1–4; Hacktivists Claim ISIS Terrorists Linked to Paris Attacks Had
Bitcoin Funding, NETWORKWORLD (Nov. 15, 2015, 9:37 AM), http://www.networkworld.com/
article/3005308/security/hacktivists-claim-isis-terrorists-linked-to-paris-attacks-had-bitcoinfunding.html.
186. See Burnstein, supra note 107, at 986–87 (advocating for countries to openly share
information, thus reducing the incentive for cyber espionage).
187. Eckert & Magnowski, supra note 65 (explaining the need for diplomatic resolution to
escalating cyber conflict).
188. See Chayes, supra note 117, at 510 & n.130; see also TALLINN MANUAL ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 92 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013)
[hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
189. See Simon Denyer, China Calls U.S. Hacking Accusations ‘Irresponsible and
Unscientific,’ WASH. POST (June 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia _pacific
/china-calls-us-hacking-accusations-irresponsible-and-unscientific/2015/06/05/7989cad3-583f417e-a0b7-34be46eb16ff_story.html.
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protection.190 These measures are beneficial in improving security across
cooperating countries, but like in the last proposal, they do little to deter
larger perpetrators in the absence of mutual gain.191 The North American
Trade Organization (NATO) has taken steps in the right direction by
creating the Tallinn Manual.192 Although it is not completely binding on
member states, the Tallinn Manual sets forth rules governing cyber
operations in the international context.193 Additionally, international
agreements would do little if there were no enforcement mechanisms
built in.194 Although baseline security measures would be beneficial for
organizations like NATO and the European Union, they are methods to
prevent breaches, not respond to them.
Some scholars have also called for the regulation of offensive cyber
weapons.195 However, these measures do not seem realistic in light of the
current buildup of cyber arms by most of the world’s more powerful
countries.196 The buildup of offensive cyber weapons has been compared
to the buildup of nuclear weapons in the Cold War era.197 This has led
scholars to conclude that similar arms reduction agreements are
necessary.198 Although such agreements would be beneficial to
demonstrate internationally the acceptable use of offensive cyber
weapons, an important aspect of effective nuclear arsenal reduction
agreements was the ability to inspect a nation’s compliance—a vital
element that would be completely lacking in the cyber realm.199 Overall,
treaties and international cooperation could be beneficial to help develop
custom among nations as to what is acceptable, however they are not an
effective response to cyber breaches that have already occurred.
A diplomatic measure that should be taken in response to cyber
intrusions is public reprimand. This would include actions such as
190. Chayes, supra note 117, at 510–12.
191. Id. at 517.
192. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 188, at 1.
193. Id. at 6. The Tallinn Manual sets forth rules governing cyber warfare based on its
interpretation of existing international law. Id. at 1–4. Therefore, the Independent Group of
Experts, the authors of the rules, state that “[t]o the extent that the Rules accurately articulate
customary international law, they are binding on all States.” Id. at 6. Although this is correct in
the sense that any international treaty ratified by a state is binding on that state, these rules are
based on interpretations of treaties as they apply to the cyber realm and have not been ratified by
the U.S. Senate. Thus, they are not binding law on the United States.
194. Chayes, supra note 117, at 513–15.
195. Id. at 517–19.
196. See id. at 515 & n.158.
197. Symposium, supra note 109, at 328.
198. Chayes, supra note 117, at 517–19.
199. Id. (stating that a Code of Conduct for states in the cyber realm would be beneficial in
developing acceptable social customs as nuclear reduction treaties did, but also stating that those
agreements relied on verification for effectiveness).
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summoning the ambassador of a foreign country, or even outing
diplomats. These actions would primarily be symbolic, but could have
some deterrent effect. These actions would only be effective against state
actors.
D. Retaliatory Countermeasures
Another approach that the United States could take in response to
cyber intrusions is retaliatory countermeasures. These measures include
a range of activities from stealing similar information from the
perpetrator to destroying or degrading networks. 200 This approach is
likely the most nuanced. It requires the United States to commit acts that
it does not want committed against itself.201
Positives of this approach are its deterrent factors. If other countries
know that stealing data from government is going to result in similar
actions against them, they may refrain from doing so.202 Additionally, if
terrorists, criminals, or hacktivists know that the United States is going
to respond to their data breaches with cyber actions, they may be less
likely to take the action in the first place.203 However, the deterrent only
works against state actors if the other country believes that the United
States is not already conducting such activities, and that the United States
would not conduct breaches unless it was first breached.204 Additionally,
the deterrent only works if the other country knows that the United States
has taken retaliatory action,205 which the United States may not want to
announce for fear of bad publicity or disclosing vulnerabilities in the
other nation’s cyber defenses.
Nonetheless, countermeasures can be an effective response against
nations when the information stolen is damaging but not catastrophic. An
example would be the PII stolen in the OPM hack.206 The United States
could steal similar data from the Chinese government and use that
information to deter the Chinese from stealing more personal data or from
using the data they already stole. This type of action would be acceptable
200. See Sanger, supra note 8.
201. See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 23, at 999.
202. See Nakashima, supra note 110.
203. For an example of the United States responding to hacktivists with a cyberattack, see
Solis, supra note 21, at 36–37.
204. Denyer, supra note 189 (citing Chinese state news agency Xinhua, which pointed to the
Edward Snowden leaks as proof that the U.S. government “appl[ied] double standards and ma[de]
unfounded accusations against China”).
205. See Nakashima, supra note 110 (quoting Maine Senator Angus King as stating that the
United States needs an offensive cyber capability and that the capability needs to be publicized
for it to be an effective deterrent).
206. Davidson, supra note 27.
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under international law as either a form of espionage207 or as a
proportionate countermeasure.208 Retaliatory countermeasures would
work best when the perpetrator is a state actor who stole information that
is not directly related to vital national security. When conducting
countermeasures against state actors, the United States should strive to
ensure that the countermeasures are proportionate and not escalatory.209
These measures can also be effective against other types of actors such
as terrorists, criminals, and hacktivists.210 However, with respect to
criminals and hacktivists, criminal prosecution is a better response
because the U.S. government should not be conducting cyber intrusions
or attacks against individuals—the criminal justice system is in place to
deal with law breakers. Terrorists, on the other hand, should face
continuing cyber action by the United States because they pose a threat
to U.S. security, and offensive cyber operations, should not be left unused
in defending against terrorism.211
E. Kinetic Responses
The last, and most severe, action the United States could take in
response to a cyber intrusion would be to use kinetic force. This response
should be seen as a last resort and should be limited to use against
terrorists, or states that have stolen information damaging to national
security. The use of force should follow the principles of distinction,
necessity, and proportionality.212 Distinction refers to the ability to direct
the effects of an attack against combatants and not civilians.213
Proportionality is the concept that a country should respond to hostilities
in a manner that is proportional. This does not necessarily refer to the
quantity or type of acts taken, but instead refers to the effects of the act

207. Espionage is generally not held as a violation of international law since most countries
actively conduct espionage against other nations. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 23, at 999.
Instead acts of espionage are punishable under domestic laws of the victim country, meaning it
would be unlikely for anyone to actually face criminal detention for such acts. See Indictment,
supra note 83, at 1–2 (indicting members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army for violating
the United State’s Computer Fraud and Abuse Act). Note, however, that this indictment was only
pursued because the hackers stole trade secrets and were not charged with espionage.
208. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 188, at 36–41 (explaining the different sources of
international law that govern countermeasures).
209. See id.
210. See Solis, supra note 21, at 36–37.
211. U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member . . . .”).
212. Davidson, supra note 129, at 91; see TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 188, at 36–41.
213. Davidson, supra note 129, at 91.
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taken.214 Necessity refers to the concept that any amount of force in
excess of what is needed to accomplish the mission is unlawful.215
If the principles of distinction, necessity, and proportionality were
followed, there would be very few situations where a cyber intrusion by
a state actor would warrant a kinetic response. Additionally, kinetic
responses should not be used against criminals or hacktivists, as doing so
would violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution.216 However, kinetic force is acceptable as a response to
terrorist data breaches if such breaches create a threat to national security
or U.S. citizens.217 The example used previously in this Note of Junaid
Hussain is a situation where kinetic force was an acceptable response to
a breach by a terrorist.218 In that instance Hussain, a known terrorist, stole
and published personal information of military personnel.219 Publishing
personal information online on its own was not enough to justify kinetic
force. However, Hussain called for lone wolves to kill the service
members whose information he had just released, escalating the breach
to a level warranting kinetic force, as it posed a threat to American
lives.220 Therefore, kinetic force should be reserved as a response to data
breaches for situations where national security is threatened or American
lives are jeopardized.
CONCLUSION
In order to limit future data breaches against government systems, the
government must have a policy in place to respond to such actions. The
types of responses analyzed in this Note create a continuum for the
government, ranging from doing nothing to using violence. The decisionmaking process is to first identify the actor, then determine what was
stolen, next analyze the potential uses of the information stolen, and lastly
initiate a response. Figure 1, above, depicts the decisional matrix for
determining the appropriate actions to take. The decision matrix assists
in choosing an appropriate response to data breaches by analyzing the
severity of the information taken and the type of actor that stole the
information. Based on this information, a range of appropriate responses
is presented.
214. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 188, at 36–41.
215. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 23, at 54–58.
216. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
217. But see John Reed, Questions the Media Should Be Asking About DOD’s Latest
Targeted Killing, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 1, 2015, 10:40 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/25729/
questions-media-dods-latest-targeted-killing/ (questioning what information is required to “land”
someone on the targeted kill list).
218. See supra Section I.B.
219. CBS NEWS, supra note 39.
220. De Freytas-Tamura, supra note 1.
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Although this decisional framework does not give the exact action to
take for every type of data intrusion against the government, it does create
the basis for a policy that government decision makers can act upon.
Therefore, this decision-making process would not only make
government responses easier, but would also send a message to potential
hackers that something will be done if they hack the United States. This
matrix is merely a tool for the government to use. The consequences of
each action, as outlined above, make picking the “correct” response
difficult. The lack of perfect information to aid decision makers is only
compounded in the cyber realm, where it is easy for anyone to mask who
they are, where they come from, when they committed the breach, and
their intentions for doing so. Gathering the information needed to
determine the inputs for the decision matrix may well be the most difficult
aspect of implementation. However, difficulty in this determination
should not result in a lack of policy—something must be done and this is
a start.
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